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From Parameters, Spring 1998, pp. 67-83.
"With fewer US forces permanently stationed overseas, we must increase our capability to project forces
abroad. . . . Our ability to rapidly project power worldwide depends on four strategic mobility
enhancements: increased airlift capability, additional pre-positioning of heavy equipment afloat and
ashore, increased surge capacity of our sealift, and improved readiness and responsiveness of the Ready
Reserve Force."[1] -- General John Shalikashvili, US Army, Ret. Former Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of
Staff

During the Cold War, US national security strategy required large forward-deployed forces in or near regions with a
high potential for crisis. Most of the troops and materiel were stationed on land. Equipment and materiel for US-based
reinforcements that were to deploy if war became imminent were also pre-positioned. With the bulk of the equipment
and materiel for reinforcing divisions in place in selected theaters of operations, the primary strategic logistics mission
during the surge phase of any conflict before 1989 was the timely movement of personnel from US aerial ports of
embarkation to link up with their equipment staged in the theater of operations.
US national security strategy now rests primarily on projection of personnel and their equipment to a theater of
operations. This change has significantly altered the strategic transporter's mission. The United States must be prepared
to deploy all the equipment and personnel for 10 Army divisions, in addition to corps and theater support elements,
and not to one theater of operations, but two. Plans based on the assumption of two nearly simultaneous major regional
conflicts require approximately five Army divisions for each conflict. Virtually all Marine Corps and Air Force assets
as well as the bulk of Navy forces must also deploy to fulfill the strategy.
The 1990-91 Gulf War and the intervention in Bosnia demonstrated that forward-deployed forces may have to be
repositioned to meet emerging crises. Additionally, some forward-deployed forces may be called upon by other
regional commanders in a crisis. So in addition to moving assets out of the United States, strategic transporters must
be prepared to transfer large numbers of personnel and significant quantities of materiel from one overseas location to
another.
Three of the four strategic mobility enhancements cited as essential by the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff depend on improved sealift capabilities: pre-positioning afloat, surge sealift, and improved readiness and
responsiveness of the Ready Reserve Force. This article examines recent trends in the US merchant fleet and new and
unprecedented international agreements governing ocean transport that will significantly affect our merchant fleet and
the US merchant seamen who crew it. The continuing decline of the US-flag merchant fleet, changes in ocean-going
billets available to US merchant seamen, and new international training and certification requirements for all merchant
seamen, regardless of nationality, play their parts individually and collectively in eroding the assumptions on which
current US surge sealift plans rest. Unless steps are taken to modify current US practices, the cumulative effects of
these changes could emerge as shortages of surge sealift personnel needed to carry out any national security strategy.
Surge Sealift Capacity
In the year 2000, the US armed services will rely on four sets of government-controlled surge sealift assets intended to
deploy heavy equipment rapidly in a crisis. These ships have differing missions and response times during the surge

phase of any intervention operation.

. The first ships to respond in a crisis are the vessels belonging to the Afloat Prepositioning Force. The Army has the
equipment of one heavy brigade afloat, and the Marine Corps has three separate Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons
that are designed to provide support for a Marine Expeditionary Brigade. The Marine Corps squadron based at Diego
Garcia provided the support for the Marine Corps when it projected the first credible heavy ground force to reach
Saudi Arabia during Desert Shield. All the ships are in full operating status with full ship crews, and are strategically
located near potential crisis areas throughout the world. In most scenarios these vessels must be under way within four
hours of notification to sail.
. The second asset is the Military Sealift Command's fast sealift ships. These eight vessels, in reduced operating status
with partial crews, are strategically located near US ports of embarkation. They must be capable of being activated
within 96 hours of notification.

. The third set of ships that the Department of Defense will call on are the 19 large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off
vessels that are currently being procured and built. Eight of these vessels will join the Afloat Prepositioning Force; the
ships currently at sea in that role will return to the Ready Reserve Force. The other 11 vessels will be strategically
located in the United States and maintained in a reduced operating status with partial crews. These vessels have a
response time comparable to that of the fast sealift ships: 96 hours to start movement to loading ports once notified.

. The fourth surge asset consists of the ships of the Ready Reserve Force. These 96 vessels are strategically located
near major US deployment seaports. Ready Reserve Force ships are maintained in four categories of readiness.[2]
Depending on their respective missions, these ships must be capable of sailing to ports of embarkation within four,
five, 10, or 20 days of notification. Ships with a four-day embarkation requirement have 10-person crews, while fiveday embarkation ships have nine-person crews. Ships with response times of 10 and 20 days have no permanently
assigned crew aboard. The Maritime Administration contracts the maintenance for these 10- and 20-day vessels, and
contractors hire teams that service all the vessels under their contract. When these ships are activated a full crew
complement must also be hired.
All of these ships rely on personnel of the US merchant marine to operate them. In normal times, the livelihood of US
merchant mariners is dependent on the existence of a US flag merchant fleet. Currently, however, that fleet continues
its recent downward spiral and can no longer be counted on to provide the required numbers of qualified personnel
necessary to crew all surge sealift assets during a period of crisis.
The Declining US Flag Fleet
At the end of World War II the US merchant marine fleet dominated the oceans. With nearly 5000 ships, the US fleet
carried half of all waterborne trade traveling between the United States and foreign nations. As of April 1996 only 319
US flag commercial ships remained, and they accounted for less than four percent of all waterborne trade traveling to
and from US shores. Even as the US flag fleet has dwindled, however, the amount of cargo being imported and
exported annually from US ports has increased from 117 million tons in 1950 to 967 million tons in 1995.[3] There are
strong indications that the US flag fleet will continue to decline at an alarming rate.
In 1996 the average age of the 319 active commercial vessels in the US merchant fleet was 19 years. Of the militarily
useful ships, breakbulk vessels averaged 25 years of service, while tankers averaged 21 years and intermodal ships 16
years. The useful life of these ship types ranges between 20 and 30 years. The long-standing cabotage requirement to
build US flag ships in US shipyards imposes capital costs that deter US ship companies from investing in US-built
vessels. As ships retire from the US fleet, companies are replacing them with vessels flying foreign flags and almost
always operated by foreign crews. As of 30 September 1996, only 16 commercial vessels larger than 1000 gross tons
were on order in all US shipyards. Nine of the tankers being built at Newport News are not for the US fleet; for the
first time since 1957, they are being built for export.[4]

Second, new ship safety requirements for the tanker fleet were established by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 in the
aftermath of the Exxon Valdez disaster. These new standards will cause the older US tanker fleet to decline rapidly
over the next several years. According to Coast Guard records, 54 of the 128 tankers in the fleet will be scrapped or
sold before 2004. Most of these ships are single-hulled tankers that are too old to justify the expenses necessary to
make them double-hulled, which is a key requirement of the 1990 act.
A third major concern is the fate of the US liner (container ship) fleet. Ship owners have said repeatedly that they
cannot operate US flag vessels, pay US taxes, comply with stringent US regulations, crew with more expensive US
seafarers, and still meet the competitive challenge in the international liner market.[5] To offset some of the added
costs, the US government in FY 1995 provided $216 million in operating differential subsidies in 26 separate contracts
to support 59 US flag ocean-going liners. The owners of these ships have indicated that they will reflag them for
commercial advantages when subsidies expire. Most of the contracts expired in 1997; the remaining subsidies expire by
2002.[6]
To help offset the prospect of losing all US flag liners, President Clinton in 1996 signed Public Law 104-239, a 10year Maritime Security Act. This act was designed to provide subsidies of $2.1 million per vessel, per year, for up to
47 US ships.[7] There are, however, significant concerns about this program. First, the new subsidies provide almost
$1 million less per vessel, per year, than allowed in the previous operating differential subsidies contracts. Second,
there are 12 fewer ships authorized in this program, 47 compared to 59 in the old program. Finally, Congress
authorized spending up to $100 million a year on the ships for 10 years. The funds, of course, must be appropriated
each year; there is no guarantee that all or any substantial portion of the authorized sum will actually be spent as
intended in the act.[8] Ship subsidies compete with other federal non-defense spending such as entitlements.
Disappearing Ocean-Going Billets
The vessels involved in the new subsidy programs are not intended to be used in the surge phase of any operation.
Their significance in this article is their contribution to the cumulative decline in the number of seagoing jobs aboard
US flag ships and the adverse effects if the US liners would be reflagged. Those outcomes will affect significantly the
number of sea billets available for US certified and licensed mariners. In April 1996 the US Maritime Administration
reported that there were 7582 seagoing billets on ocean-going US flag vessels, including billets aboard governmentowned reserve ships in active or reduced operating status.[9]
The international term used to describe the total number of individuals required to crew a vessel, or fleet of vessels, is
called the "establishment." The US establishment is currently three crews for two ships, or a ratio of 1.5 mariners for
each billet. This means that considering those on vacation or on sick leave, the current establishment is roughly 11,373
mariners. The Maritime Administration has indicated that approximately 2638 mariners would be required to activate
all the ships in the Ready Reserve Force. This activation number is for the initial phase of any crisis and does not
consider personnel in leave status. The establishment to operate the vessels beyond the initial four months would be
closer to 4000 mariners. The Maritime Administration counts on filling the gap from the pool of mariners on leave
from ships at the time as well as those with valid Merchant Marine documents and licenses but not actively sailing.
During the 1990-91 Gulf War, for every six active mariners in the supportable pool, one mariner was employed
crewing vessels in the Ready Reserve Force. The 1996 estimate of the supportable pool was approximately 8221
mariners.[10] So if 4000 mariners would be required to operate reserve fleet vessels in a prolonged crisis, the pool of
qualified mariners will likely be insufficient both to crew the commercial fleet and at the same time to sail all surge
sealift assets. The thesis of this article is that with recent and proposed unprecedented changes in the laws affecting the
licensing and documentation of mariners, the pool of qualified merchant mariners available to crew the surge sealift
ships will be significantly reduced over the next five years.
There has been a concerted attack on the 1884 Passenger Ship Act and 1920 Jones Act, with the intent to soften or
eliminate the acts altogether. The belief of the opponents of these cabotage acts is that there will be economic benefits
in opening our trade for foreign carriers to operate between domestic ports such as New York and Boston or Chicago
and Cleveland. Proponents of the acts point to the economic benefits in shipbuilding and jobs that would be lost. They
also see the possibility that other forms of transportation such as airlines and trains that operate under similar cabotage
acts may find their domestic routes open to foreign operators if the Jones Act is eliminated.

The scope of this article does not allow for a comprehensive discussion of the economic implications of these acts;
however, the elimination of the Jones Act would mean a drastic reduction in the US commercial fleet--to
approximately 50 vessels--and the loss of 87 percent of shipboard billets.[11] New regulations (discussed later) will
limit the ability of inland mariners to sail offshore. Abolishing these acts would therefore virtually eliminate any
surplus pool of certified and licensed US merchant mariners.
Apart from issues related to the fate of the Passenger Ship Act and the Jones Act, the loss of billets is a continuing
problem whose consequences require careful consideration. Federal agencies have examined the need for an available
pool of mariners to sail strategic sealift assets.

. A 1994 GAO report stated that at that time the United States had sufficient merchant mariners qualified and capable
of sailing surge sealift ships, but the study warned that the situation could change and should be monitored closely.[12]

. In December 1995 the US Navy published a study on manpower requirements for crewing strategic sealift assets.[13]
The study examined four crewing options, one of which, use of Merchant Marine Reserve forces (which are US Naval
Reserve personnel), was found to be the most costly and the most restrictive for the projected DOD scenarios.[14] The
study, which concluded that the use of merchant mariners was the most cost-effective option, also made several key
assumptions, some of which appear now to have been unduly simplified, even suspect, at the time of the study. The
assumptions, which are important to the remainder of this analysis of future US surge sealift capacity, covered reemployment rights for mariners, crewing by every available mariner, and, most important, cross employment between
competing maritime unions. The Navy study concluded that there would be a meager surplus of available officers and
a shortfall of unlicensed mariners by the year 2005, but it did not discuss impending legislation that might affect the
documentation and licensing of mariners.
One of the primary reasons merchant seamen did not sail surge sealift assets during the Gulf War was that they had no
assurance of re-employment rights were they to leave their jobs to take short-term missions on surge sealift ships.
Recognizing this problem, steps were taken to give US-flag merchant fleet sailors who elect to serve on ships in
reduced operating status during the next conflict a decided advantage over their predecessors. With the passage of the
Maritime Security Act in October 1996, US seafarers in time of war or national emergency now have the same basic
re-employment rights as members of the reserve components of the armed forces.[15]
What was not taken into consideration at the time the 1996 act was passed is the dwindling size of the US-flag fleet
and the new requirements of the International Safety Management Code. The shrinking US fleet makes it likely that in
any future crisis or conflict, many US merchant mariners will be working on vessels operating under foreign flags.
These sailors are not guaranteed the same basic re-employment rights that their counterparts in the US flag fleet enjoy.
Consequently, we can only speculate about the number of men and women who might be inclined to leave foreign flag
ships that are not bound by the Maritime Security Act to sail surge sealift assets if they are not certain of reemployment by their shipping companies at the conclusion of the crisis.
Three additional conditions apply here. First, as a result of new requirements for training and certifying their
personnel, US shipping companies may be reluctant to release members of their ship crews in a crisis. Furthermore, as
described below, it is increasingly possible that the requirements of the International Safety Management Code will
invalidate the assumption in the Navy's 1995 study that there will be cross-employment rights between competing
maritime unions. Finally, other studies have shown that for various legitimate reasons, of an estimated 9000 excess
mariners presumed available for surge support during the Gulf War, 55 percent did not sail on ships maintained in
reduced operating status. Nothing has occurred since 1991 that would reduce this high percentage of non-deployable
mariners, thus challenging, if not invalidating, the assumption in the 1995 Navy study that every available mariner
would sail if called upon.
New Conventions and Codes Affect Maritime Training and Certification Requirements
There is a movement in the commercial shipping industry to improve the safety of life at sea and preserve the ocean
environment. The International Maritime Organization (IMO), with 153 member nations, is leading the effort to reach

these goals. Two conventions dealing with safety have recently been ratified, and the United States has signed both.
These conventions give individual nation-states improved police powers to enforce the requirements of the
international conventions. Nations that decide not to abide by the conventions will be placed on a blacklist maintained
by the IMO, and their ships can be declared unseaworthy or denied entry at foreign seaports. The two primary
conventions are those that establish 1995 amendments to the 1978 Standards of Training, Certification, and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), and that prescribe the International Safety Management (ISM) Code.
One possible outcome of the new conventions and codes is the severe reduction, if not outright elimination, of the pool
of excess "qualified" mariners currently working shoreside that DOD is counting on to crew surge sealift ships during
the next major deployment. The 1994 GAO report and the 1995 US Navy study, although aware of the potential
changes, could not adequately acknowledge this situation because the new conventions had not been fully adopted at
the time of their publication. Strategic planners should examine closely the combined effects of the new codes, the
declining number of US mariners sailing aboard US flag vessels, and (although the reports cited above discuss the
problem) the number of losses facing the US merchant fleet and the rate at which they are occurring.
Training and Manning Under the 1978 Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers
Training and certification of mariners throughout the world is supposed to be guided by the convention on STCW
adopted in 1978, enacted in 1984, and subsequently amended in 1995. The objective of this treaty, which set
qualifications for masters, officers, and watchkeeping personnel on seagoing merchant ships, was to provide a training
baseline that would, if enforced, improve the quality of merchant sailors worldwide. As nations signed the convention,
they agreed to upgrade, as appropriate, national maritime training standards to reflect the improvements required by the
STCW convention.
The United States did not ratify the convention until 1991, and by 1996, when the required changes took effect in the
United States, the original treaty had been revised. The 1978 convention proved to have serious limitations, among
which were widespread abuse of vague standards and requirements, outdated technical references, insufficient portstate controls, and excessive reliance on static methods, such as written exams, for determining competency. Member
states began in 1993 to re-engineer the 1978 convention; changes in technology, the findings of marine human factor
studies, and the increasing use of mariners from nations without a maritime tradition all contributed to the imperative
for updating the original convention.[16]
The current STCW convention reflects independent US Coast Guard studies which concluded that almost 85 percent of
all maritime accidents are due to human error. The United States, as one might expect, was a strong advocate of
revision and played a crucial role in the redesign process.[17] The revised convention set several broad objectives
which signatory states are to achieve in improving the skill levels of their mariners: dynamic assessment of proficiency
for mariners; establishment of instructor and examiner qualification standards; establishment of quality standards for
courses and schools; improvement of record-keeping of training; and verification of medical fitness of mariners. At
this writing, the US Coast Guard is modifying the Code of Federal Regulations to mirror the new STCW standards.
The revised standards will have a significant effect on mariners documented and licensed under the old system in the
United States. The proposed change to the Code of Federal Regulations will affect not only individual training, but also
training institutions, shipboard equipment, licensing procedures, manning requirements, record-keeping, testing
processes, and port-state controls.[18] Furthermore, it will become increasingly difficult, without time at sea or in
approved courses, for seafarers to obtain or maintain both traditional merchant marine documents and the new STCW
endorsements. The domestic US fleet will not be compliant with the STCW requirements, and mariners sailing
domestically will not automatically meet the requirements for an ocean-going (STCW) document or license. As a
result, the stringent new skill requirements, coupled with the shrinking US flag ocean-going fleet, will tend to reduce
the current pool of merchant mariners capable of sailing DOD surge sealift assets. The revised convention on STCW
took effect in February 1997; all measures must be implemented by participating nations no later than 2003.[19]
Historically the United States has integrated a number of retired and former military personnel with military maritime
training into the US Merchant Marine. The current military maritime training courses will have to meet STCW
guidelines to qualify those individuals for the STCW endorsement. Otherwise these individuals may require additional
training to meet STCW guidelines before they can join the merchant marine.

The revised STCW convention places new certification and licensing requirements on merchant sailors, increases
oversight requirements on companies operating international ocean-going vessels, and gives increased police powers to
nation-states by allowing them to enforce STCW standards more effectively than acknowledged in the 1978 version.
Any vessels sailing to foreign countries that are enforcing the standards of the International Maritime Organization
must be crewed by mariners with STCW endorsements. The immediate effect in the United States of these revised
standards will be to create two categories of mariners--those with the endorsements and those without. Inland and
Great Lakes mariners, for example, will not be required to conform to STCW standards, and institutions that train only
inland or Great Lakes mariners may elect not to adopt the new standards.
To comply with the 1996 standards, training institutions and courses leading to the new certificates must be approved
by the Coast Guard before instruction can begin. Course instructors and examiners also must be certified by the Coast
Guard, and the instructor and examiner cannot be the same individual. Training institutions that have only a marginal
demand for mariners certified to STCW standards may elect to forgo this part of the business. The industry will
therefore undergo a consolidation of approved training institutions, with the result that our ability to train large
numbers of ocean-going mariners on short notice may be reduced.
Changes in Shipboard Communications Standards
A recent change in shipboard communications standards increases the training required for the merchant fleet.[20] The
1996 Telecommunications Act (PL-104-104) eliminates the requirement for US flag vessels to carry radio telegraphy
equipment if the vessel is equipped with the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS). This new system
offers a ship owner three options for using the equipment: one set of equipment with a dedicated onboard maintainer,
one set of required equipment with a shore-based maintenance program, and redundant equipment aboard the ship. The
Coast Guard in its rulemaking has added the requirement that all licensed US deck officers must be GMDSS operators,
and it requires that all mariners trained on the system attend an approved operations training course to certify
competency.
Most companies will eliminate the traditional radio officer to reduce personnel costs. Deck officers will be required to
have an FCC operator's license for the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System, and be required to complete a
training course approved by the Coast Guard. The US Merchant Marine Academy has offered an elective course and a
licensing option for its deck-licensed midshipmen, and more recently has embedded a course on the system and a
licensing requirement into its curriculum for all classes graduating after 1997. The maritime unions also have
established very progressive programs to help actively sailing members obtain these licenses; these initiatives do not,
however, change the fact that additional requirements have been added for all mariners currently holding licenses. This
means that the reserve pool of deck officers working shore jobs, whom the Department of Defense is counting on to be
available and willing to sail surge ships in reduced operating status, will have to undergo the required GMDSS training
after call-up and before departure into international waters.
In addition to new requirements for institutional training, and for certification and training in GMDSS, the figures
below and on the following page list the remaining requirements necessary to maintain a license under the provisions
of the amended STCW. Figure 1, below, shows the old and new requirements for a deck officer on a roll-on/roll-off
vessel which also transfers petroleum products. The Military Sealift Command's Corporal Hauge and Bob Hope fit
this description. Perhaps more telling than a list of requirements is the fact that the new endorsements will require
approximately seven weeks of course work in addition to practical experience. Course fees, per diem, and loss of
wages could easily exceed $20,000 per mariner.
Deck Officer Requirements
1996

2003*

1. US Coast Guard License 1. US Coast Guard License
2. Radar Endorsement

2. Radar Endorsement

-

3. STCW Endorsement

-

4. FCC GMDSS License

-

5. GMDSS Operator's Course Endorsement

-

6. ARPA Endorsement

-

7. Roll-On/Roll-Off Endorsement

-

8. Advanced Firefighting Certificate

-

9. Bridge Teamwork Course Endorsement

-

10. Personal Survival Course Endorsement

-

11. Personal Safety and Social Responsibility Course Endorsement

* All officers seeking renewal of their licenses must produce proof of either recency of sailing or
attendance at refresher courses within the five-year renewal period.
Figure 1. Deck Officer Requirements

Add to this situation the fact that training generally is not offered to personnel who are not actively sailing. One has to
wonder if a mariner currently not sailing and faced with dismal commercial ocean-going opportunities will pay the
out-of-pocket costs to obtain and maintain proficiency in all, or any, of the new certification requirements. It is
reasonable to assume that commercial carriers will train only the minimum number of personnel required to adequately
crew their own operational fleets. A significant number of individuals may therefore allow their licenses to lapse,
further reducing the pool of available and qualified mariners for surge shipping requirements that figured in the
assumptions used in the 1994 and 1995 studies.
To serve as a properly certified deck officer in 2003 aboard an MSC Bob Hope class vessel that is in compliance with
the STCW convention, individuals must have all the certificates and endorsements listed in Figure 1. Engineering
officers would need all of the endorsements in Figure 2, below. Unlicensed personnel would require all of the
engineering endorsements except the license. Crew members with all of these credentials, especially senior experienced
individuals, seem destined to be scarce in the near future. Additionally, when breaking out vessels in reduced operating
status during an emergency, officers and unlicensed personnel may not be interchangeable unless a concerted effort is
made to cross-train between ship types. This will make annual and sick leave more difficult to manage in peacetime as
well as during emergency operations.
Engineering Officer Requirements
1996

2003*

1. US Coast Guard License 1. US Coast Guard License
-

2. STCW Endorsement

-

3. Roll-On/Roll-Off Endorsement

-

4. Advanced Firefighting Certificate

-

5. Personal Survival Course Endorsement

-

6. Personal Safety and Social Responsibility Course Endorsement

* All officers and unlicensed mariners seeking renewal of their licenses must produce proof of
either recency of sailing or attendance at refresher courses within the five-year renewal period.

Figure 2. Deck Officer Requirements

The International Safety Management Code
The International Safety Management Code is an amendment to the Safety of Life at Sea Convention that will go into
effect for all tankers, bulkers, and passenger vessels over 500 gross tons on 1 August 1998, and for all other vessels
over 500 gross tons by 2002.[21] The code will have a multidimensional effect on manning, since it requires that all
company shipboard employees be in compliance with all regulations, such as the STCW discussed above. Each
company will have to assess training needs unique to its vessels and assure that all mariners receive the increased
training. The International Safety Management Code stipulates that each company establish strict record-keeping
procedures for the company and for crew members. Each company will need to establish training programs that meet
the objectives of the company's own written safety and environmental protection policy, and will have to establish a
continuous improvement process and educate all of its personnel, afloat and ashore, in its use.[22]
Companies face internal and external audits to ensure compliance with this code. Once the company passes the
external audits, a Document of Compliance will be issued by its flag state. Each ship in the fleet will then be audited
and issued a Safety Management Certificate. The shipping company's investment in time and money to educate its
shipboard personnel will work against the treatment of seamen as casual labor; it also could put an end to the
traditional view of crew as interchangeable among most ships operated by a particular company. This in turn may
make entry into the industry more restrictive and require recruiting of higher-quality personnel. Even if the total
number of mariners in the supportable pool were not to decline because of the ISM code requirements, their
interchangeability will be substantially reduced.
The US Navy's 1995 study assumed cross-employment between maritime unions; that assumption may still be valid.
However, the effects of the ISM code on cross-employment between competing companies was not addressed.
Companies that have paid to ensure they have mariners who meet all the requirements of their Safety Management
Certificates will be reluctant to release those mariners on short notice, knowing that they will have to train new
individuals to standard if they are to maintain their current operations. A company's failure to comply with the terms of
the ISM code could result in denial of entry into ports and a possible claim of unseaworthiness.
In a national emergency, if a company releases sailors to crew reserve vessels, and cannot replace them with
"qualified" mariners, then that company's ships may legitimately be denied access to foreign ports until it trains new
crews to replace the ones that are sailing in support of the US military. Furthermore, if there is no "qualified" reserve
pool of mariners and the United States crews the surge sealift ships with unqualified sailors, these ships may be denied
access to foreign ports, especially those located in countries that do not support the actions of the United States, and
the ships would be subject to being impounded for unseaworthiness once they enter foreign waters.
Tankerman Regulations
There is a third category of change that could affect this element of the strategic mobility triad: tankerman regulations.
In 1997 new rules came into force regarding qualifications for tankermen and persons in charge (PIC) of transfers of
dangerous liquids and liquefied gases.[23] The immediate effect on personnel was to make individuals who have not
sailed on a tanker within the previous five years ineligible to serve as persons in charge. Consequently, the labor pool
that existed in January 1997, containing several thousand deck-licensed officers and unlicensed mariners who could
crew reserve tankers, declined to several hundred individuals with the entry into force of these new qualification
standards.
The practical implication of the new rules is that individuals who want to sail as a person in charge of certain tanker
activities now need to take an approved PIC tankerman course before renewal of their license. In addition to the
course, individuals requiring a PIC certificate must have sailed within the five years prior to license renewal and must
have been involved in 10 documented transfers of dangerous liquids or liquefied gases. A review of union training
documents revealed that even in the two-week courses, students get credit for a maximum of only two transfers, eight
short of the PIC requirement.[24] Without actual sailing time, it will be virtually impossible to meet this new
requirement as presently written, regardless of who pays for the training.

Policy Issues
Some argue that in order to fill empty billets during a crisis, the Military Sealift Command may elect to claim public
vessel status for its ships, thus exempting surge sealift assets from convention standards. However--and this is a
significant policy issue to be examined--at this writing the Military Sealift Command does not consider a ship in the
Ready Reserve Force fully operational until a complete crew has been provided and all required regulatory certificates
have been obtained.[25] If this requirement remains unmodified, it means that unions providing sailors for surge sealift
ships will have to ensure that those sailors hold all required convention endorsements.
But even if the Military Sealift Command chooses to declare surge sealift assets to be "public vessels," a question
arises: Should there be a pay differential for those mariners who have gone through the process and expense of
obtaining and maintaining the endorsements while serving alongside less-qualified mariners on those vessels? Other
issues that could affect current operations include:
When employment aboard commercial ships is at best scarce, how will a pool of mariners who are qualified to
crew surge sealift ships exist without external support?
Should the Navy, Military Sealift Command, or the Maritime Administration receive additional public funds to
help subsidize a qualified reserve pool of mariners?
Should additional training expenses be factored in for new hire rates on ships chartered by the Military Sealift
Command?
As US flag vessels disappear, should graduates of maritime schools (union, state, and federal) be allowed to sail
aboard foreign flag vessels in order to maintain recency requirements and obtain the required practical
experience?
How will drilling Naval Reserve officers in the Merchant Marine Individual Ready Reserve program maintain
and upgrade their licenses in light of the new requirements? This question prompts these follow-on concerns:
Should the Navy approve active duty for training orders for these officers so they can take the required
courses?
Should the Navy fund these officers to attend required training courses needed to maintain their licenses?
Should the promotion requirements for these officers be changed?
The United States is a signer of the 1996 revision of the STCW convention, and the US Coast Guard has proposed
rules to bring the US Code of Federal Regulations in line with the requirements of the convention. It will become
increasingly difficult for seafarers to obtain or maintain Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping
endorsements, and as a result the revised convention will probably reduce the current pool of merchant mariners
capable of sailing US surge sealift ships.
Whenever possible, shipping companies will take advantage of automation to reduce crew size. For instance, the
Global Maritime Distress and Safety System will likely eliminate almost all of the radio operators under the US flag.
Currently US companies operate cargo vessels with crews that range in size from 16 to 30 people. Constant changes in
automation aboard ships will likely continue to reduce the total number of crew members on active commercial ships,
further reducing the pool of actively sailing mariners. Europeans are currently operating vessels with one-person
bridges and a total crew of seven. The short-term economic advantages at such crew levels are compelling, and US
flag vessels will need to follow suit to remain competitive. However, this type of skeleton crewing, while raising
serious safety issues, also further depletes the pool of mariners. The ships being acquired for surge sealift, either as
newly built or used, require crews larger than commercial vessels, and the shortfall is expected to be made up by
tapping those "qualified" mariners not actively sailing.
The Ready Reserve Force of 94 ships, the eight fast sealift ships, and the 11 new roll-on/roll-off vessels constitute 113
ships that will require approximately 3900 mariners: about 3170 crew members for the current ships in the Ready
Reserve Force, approximately 320 for the fast sealift ships, and around 400 for the large new roll-on/roll-off
vessels.[26] But if the US government does not respond to the kinds of changes under way within the merchant
marine, we could face a shortage of more than 2600 mariners qualified and licensed to the new standards who will be
needed to crew all surge sealift assets.

This article suggests that unlike our 1990-91 experience, the United States will no longer be able to invite 65-year-old
retired merchant mariners to return to sea. Even unskilled entry-level sailors will have to obtain endorsements and
training not foreseen during the most recent analyses of US surge sealift capacity. The expected shakeout of certified
maritime schools and instructors qualified to meet International Maritime Organization standards will impair our ability
to recruit off the street and train individuals on short notice. The cost of compliance with the new regulations will force
some casual mariners out of the industry unless they can find support to maintain sailing recency and to attend training.
Companies will not be as willing to release members of their active crews to fill surge sealift billets because the ISM
code will require them to be replaced with similarly qualified individuals before their own ships can sail.
There is a belief in some quarters that a prospective shortage of US merchant mariners can be offset by the use of
foreign seamen. A detailed discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this article, but historical analyses of World
War II, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War indicate that serious political and security problems attend this suggestion.
Setting those issues aside, we still find that there is a serious flaw in the proposal to use foreign seamen. The effects of
the new regulations are not unique to the US maritime industry, and the demands of the seafaring profession have
deterred entry. A recent study by the International Shipping Federation forecast a worldwide shortage of merchant
mariners by the year 2000 (see Figure 3, below).[27] The world's largest supplier of seafarers, the Philippines, is
concerned that it may not make the IMO's "white list" of complying countries. The Philippines provide almost 20
percent of active merchant sailors worldwide, with more than 100 schools offering maritime courses. Experts feel that
few Philippine schools meet the strict new IMO standards.[28] Even if the political and security issues could be settled,
a serious question would remain as to the availability, to say nothing of the willingness, of foreign mariners to venture
into harm's way in support of US national security interests.

Figure 3. Worldwide Supply and Demand for Merchant Marine Officers.

Conclusion
The United States depends on its sealift assets for any significant intervention operations. The Department of Defense
recognizes this and is spending billions of dollars to acquire new and used vessels for the purpose of deploying forces
in accordance with the national security strategy. Starting in 1996 the Department of Defense resumed funding the
maintenance and upkeep of the Ready Reserve Force. So while the square footage needed for rapid deployment is
being addressed, a most vital element in the process--mariners to sail the ships in time of national emergency--also
needs to be addressed in greater depth.
The shrinking US flag fleet, automation, and changing international maritime codes and conventions have created a
potential shortfall of merchant seamen much more severe than might have been expected due to normal attrition. If
action is not taken to counteract the many factors that could produce a crew shortage, then large numbers of vessels in
the Ready Reserve Force could sit idle during the critical early stages of the next major regional conflict. Difficult
questions must be answered, policy decisions reached, and funds provided to correct this situation. Finding a workable
solution will require government, labor, and industry to act in unison to provide financial support to maintain a fully

qualified pool of merchant mariners.
Taking the position that we will identify reduced operating status vessels as "public ships" in order to avoid complying
with international conventions is fraught with potential difficulties. There are 153 member states in the International
Maritime Organization. For the United States to project our non-compliant sealift assets abroad in a crisis, we will
have to persuade other seafaring nations also to forgo compliance with ratified international conventions. We should
not assume that we will be able to sail through the Suez and Panama canals without complying with the new
requirements. Neither should we assume that in a limited conflict all foreign countries will allow non-compliant US
vessels and crews access to their ports or that laborers in those ports will work our ships. Perhaps most important, this
quick fix of declaring reduced operating status ships to be "public vessels" does not solve the problem of a shortage of
qualified mariners.
The maritime academies, union schools, and industry have for many years been producing world-class mariners. The
men and women of the merchant marine have stepped forward to volunteer in every conflict our nation has fought.
However, when the number of idle surge ships begins to reach the same size as a dwindling commercial fleet, then
there is no place for these mariners to sail, and as a result the United States will lack the qualified mariners necessary
to operate both fleets in time of crisis. The federal government, in concert with the shipping companies and maritime
unions, should begin now to develop a national maritime policy that addresses these fundamental issues to ensure a
sufficiency of qualified mariners. The United States cannot wait until servicemen and women are under fire to solve
these issues.
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